

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01

AID-20 AF-10 PC-15 DRC-01 INT-08 DOTE-00 /214 W

----- 075331

R 040605Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8215

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT POUCH

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KUWAIT 4205

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINS MU

SUBJ: SOME NOTES ON OMAN

REF: A) KUWAIT 4101; B) KUWAIT 3461; C) KUWAIT 3464; D) KUWAIT
1866

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH OMANIS STAUNCHLY ARAB ORIENTED, THEY PRESENTLY
LARGELY CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS. DHOFAR WAR CONTINUES
TO BE PRIMARY CONCERN AND MANY OMANIS RESENT MILITARY EXPEND-
ITURES WHEN DEVELOPMENT SO URGENTLY NEEDED. SAF COMMANDER
CREASEY, CALMED AFTER "FLAP" FOLLOWING MALONEY VISIT, SAID
OPERATIONS TO EXPAND PACIFIED AREAS ARE PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY.
US PRESENCE IN OMAN GROWING, BUT APPROPRIATE USG RESPONSE STILL
NEEDED TO SULTAN'S REQUEST FOR SOME ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF
US INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR OMAN. I BELIEVE US TECHNICAL HELP
IN INSTITUTION BUILDING PRESENTS REAL POSSIBILITY. ACTION

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REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO SUGGESTION

FOR VISITS OF USGS AND FHWA REPS TO OMAN TO STUDY POSSIBILITIES.
END SUMMARY.

1. ALTHOUGH SULTAN QABUS IS DETERMINED TO DEMONSTRATE HE IS ARAB LEADER AND THAT HIS COUNTRY IS INTEGRAL PART OF ARAB WORLD, OMANIS ARE LARGELY CONCERNED WITH THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS; AND ISRAELI-ARAB DISPUTE SEEMS FAR AWAY. FOLLOWING ARE OTHER OBSERVATIONS ON OMAN BASED ON MY RECENT VISIT THERE. (REF A).

2. DHOFAR WAR REMAINS TOPIC NUMBER ONE IN OMAN AND IS LIKELY

STAY SO FOR LONG TIME TO COME. REBELS APPARENTLY ARE BEING CONTAINED, AND EVEN BEING FORCED BACK, BUT MANY OMANIS BITTERLY RESENT COSTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH COUNTRY WITH SO MANY NEEDS CAN ILL AFFORD. EXTREME BRITISH SENSITIVITY REGARDING THEIR ROLE IN WAR ILLUSTRATED BY "FLAP" THAT DEVELOPED AFTER SECDEF REP COL MALONEY'S FACT FINDING MISSION IN SEPTEMBER (REF C). SAF COMMANDER CREASEY, WHO WAS AWAY FROM OMAN DURING MALONEY VISIT, RETURNED FROM LONDON TO DISCOVER THAT IN HIS ABSENCE CERTAIN MALONEY SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN SAF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS HAD BEEN SELECTED FOR IMPLEMENTATION, "BY ORDER OF THE SULTAN." CREASEY TOOK ALLEGED ACTION OF SULTAN AS REFLECTION ON HIS COMPETENCE AND OFFERED RESIGN. HOWEVER, CHARGE QUINLAN AND BRIT AMB HAWLEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN COOLING HIM DOWN. HAWLEY WAS HELPFUL IN OFFERING THEORY THAT SULTAN'S CANADIAN EQUERRY, BY MISINTERPRETING SULTAN'S FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON MALONEY'S REPORT (DELIBERATELY OR OTHERWISE), WAS REAL CAUSE OF MISUNDERSTANDING. IN ANY EVENT I TALKED TO CREASEY AND HAWLEY AND MADE IT PLAIN NEITHER MALONEY NOR ANYONE ELSE IN USG HAD SLIGHTEST INTENTION OF UPSTAGING BRITISH MILITARILY IN OMAN OR OF ROCKING BOAT IN ANY WAY. CREASEY WAS GRATEFUL AND SAID MATTER WAS CLOSED AS FAR AS HE CONCERNED.

3. CREASEY GAVE QUINLAN AND ME EXCELLENT DETAILED BRIEFING ON DHOFAR WAR, ESSENCE OF WHICH WAS THAT OPERATIONS TO EXPAND PACIFIED AREAS ARE PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY AND THAT, WITHIN TWO YEARS, BRITISH HOPE HAVE EASTERN AND CENTRAL SECTORS CLEARED OF REBELS, BARBED WIRE NORTH-SOUTH FENCE LINE CONSTRUCTED IN WESTERN MOUNTAINS TO PREVENT REBEL INFILTRATIONS FROM PDRY, AND LEAVE REST OF WESTERN SECTOR FACING ON PDRY TO REBELS. TO ANY AMERICAN,

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MOST CHILLING STATEMENT CREASEY MADE WAS HIS BELIEF WAR COULD BE WON IN TWO YEARS TIME; ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS MORE MONEY, SUPPLIES AND MEN. "WE CAN WIN, THAT IS IF PDRY DOES NOT ESCALATE THE WAR." (COMMENT: THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE SITUATION US VERY WELL ADVISED STAY OUT OF.)

4. IRANIAN MILITARY AID TO OMAN IS WELCOME AND EFFECIVE, AS IS JORDANIAN INPUT. SULTAN IS STILL WAITING FOR THE SAUDIS.

5. HAD OPPORTUNITY TALK TO QAIS ZAWAWI ON EVE HIS APPOINTMENT AS FONMIN. TOLD HIM IN MY OPINION OMAN NEEDED MONEY AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE, AND LOTS OF IT AVAILABLE FROM NEIGHBORS SUCH AS KUWAIT, ABU DHABI AND QATAR. PART OF PROBLEM AS I SAW IT WAS TOO TIGHT OMANI INVESTMENT LAWS. ZAWAWI, WHO HAS EXTENSIVE BUSINESS INTERESTS OF HIS OWN, SAID HE AGREED ENTIRELY. OMAN MUST ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL. HE ADDED CAPITAL FROM KUWAIT WOULD NOT ONLY BE BENEFICIAL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BUT COULD HAVE POLITICAL SPIN-OFF IN TERMS CREATING KUWAITI VESTED INTEREST IN OMAN'S SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE AGAINST THREAT FROM PDRY WHICH HAS COMMANDED MORE OF KUWAIT'S ATTENTION TO DATE.

6. ALTHOUGH HE WILL BE SORELY MISSED IN OMANI FONMINISTRY, AHMAD MAKKI WILL BE GREAT ADDITION TO ARAB DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN WASHINGTON. HE IS ENERGETIC, ARTICULATE, MODERATE, KNOWLEDGEABLE. ARABS BADLY NEED MORE REPRESENTATIVES OF HIS CALIBER.

7. US PRESENCE IN OMAN, WHILE STILL TOO MODEST, IS GROWING AND IS ON RIGHT TRACK. IN PRIVATE SECTOR FMC AND MARDELA ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHING, AND PEACE CORPS IS OFF TO GOOD START, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURAL AND HEALTH SECTORS. PEACE CORPS' FRUSTRATION TO DATE IS ITS ATTEMPTS LAUNCH EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM IS DUE CHAOTIC STATE OF AFFAIRS IN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8216

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 KUWAIT 4205

8. WE AT AMEMBASSY MUSCAT ARE STILL SEARCHING FOR APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO SULTAN'S REQUEST OF MANY MONTHS AGO FOR SOME ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF US INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR OMAN (REF D). THIS REQUEST, SEVERAL TIMES CONVEYED BY FONMIN FAHAD AND UNDERSECRETARY MAKKI, HAS ALWAYS BEEN VAGUE. IMPLICATION HAS BEEN THAT GOO DOES NOT REALLY KNOW WHAT TO ASK USG FOR AND THAT US HAS BETTER IDEA OF WHAT OMAN NEEDS THAN OMANIS THEMSELVES. OMANIS HAVE PRETTY WELL STAYED AWAY FROM SUGGESTIONS FOR US HELP IN MILITARY FIELD EXCEPT FOR RECENT REQUEST FOR US AID IN AIR DEFENSE (REF B). I CERTAINLY DO NOT RPT NOT ADVOCATE US HELP IN AIR DEFENSE, BUT QUESTION IS DO WE OWE OMANIS AN ANSWER (I.E. POLITE TURN-DOWN) OR IS THIS NOW DEAD ISSUE IN SULTAN'S MIND. PERHAPS WE COULD CHECK WITH BRITISH ON THIS POINT IN MUSCAT AND/OR LONDON.

9. I AM ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT IDEAS OF JOHN TOWNSEND, GOO ECON ADVISER, WHO SUGGESTED TO ECONOFF MCELDFOWNEY AND ME THAT OMAN'S GREATEST NEED WAS IN INSTITUTION BUILDING. WHEN I CITED EXAMPLES
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OF US GOVT AND PRIVATE TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN INSTITUTION BUILDING, TOWNSEND REPLIED SIMILAR PROJECTS WERE PRECISELY WHAT WAS REQUIRED IN OMAN. HE WAS, HE SAID, LOOKING FOR CONCENTRATED HELP IN ESTABLISHING ENTIRE ORGANIZATIONS, INSTEAD OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERTS SCATTERED WITHIN GOO AND AMONG NUMBER OF PROJECTS. GIVING EXAMPLE OF BRITISH PLANS TO FOUND AGRICULTURAL TECHNICAL SCHOOL, TOWNSEND SAID TWO OTHER SPECIFIC AREAS OF NEED WERE ESTABLISHMENT OF HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OR COMMISSION, AND CREATION OF GEOLOGICAL STUDY CENTER. I TOLD TOWNSEND I PERSONALLY THOUGHT THERE WERE VERY REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR US TECHNICAL HELP IN BOTH THESE AREAS: USGS REPS WERE SOON TO ARRIVE IN OMAN, AND WE HAD EXPERIENCED FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION FHWA REPS WHO HAVE DONE EXCELLENT JOB OF ORGANIZING STREETS AND ROADS BUILDING, MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING IN KUWAIT. TOWNSEND SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD FOLLOW UP THESE IDEAS SOONEST; GOO PREPARED PAY THE COSTS.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S EARLY REACTION TO THOUGHTS IN PRECEDING PARA. RECOMMEND USGS SEND REP TO OMAN TO STUDY POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND

TRAINING CENTER. (WOULD LIKE SEEM HIM HERE IN KUWAIT EN ROUTE.)
RECOMMEND ALSO THAT WE SEND BREWER, HEAD OF FHWA TEAM HERE,

TO OMAN TO TAKE SIMILAR LOOK AT POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING
OMANI HIGHWAY AUTHORITY.
STOLTZFUS

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